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Abstract: This article empirically investigates the effect of intelligence on inflation, using data from 
122 countries, over the period 1990 – 2013. The findings suggest strong evidence for the hypothesis 
that intelligence is negatively linked to inflation. This paper documents that on average, when 
national IQ increases from the level of El Salvador (78 points) to that of Malaysia (91.7 points), the 
long run inflation decreases by 27 percent. In particular, the negative effect of intelligence on 
inflation is stronger in countries with low levels of democracy. The negative impact of national IQ 
remains robust when controlled for potential determinants of inflation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last two decades, there has been voluminous research on the macroeconomic 
consequences of intelligence (e.g. Meisenberg, 2012). Indeed, related studies link national IQ to 
economic growth (Ram, 2007), total factor productivity (Jones, 2012), GDP per capita (Lynn & 
Vanhanen, 2002), financial development (Salahodjaev, 2015a) and wellbeing (Salahodjaev, 2015b). 
Further, national IQ successfully predicts cross-country variations in behavioral tendencies (e.g. 
alcohol consumption, suicide rates) (e.g. Belasen & Hafer, 2013; Voracek, 2004; Salahodjaev & 
Azam, 2015a). Albeit previous studies recognized intelligence as macroeconomic stability resource, 
there is no evidence if intelligence is associated with inflation, another antecedent for stable 
macroeconomic environment (Favero & Rovelli, 2003). Understanding the nature and causes of 
inflation differentials across the nations is important as inflation has detrimental consequences to 
society increasing income inequality (Albanesi, 2007), corruption (Braun, 2004) and crime (Gillani 
et al., 2009). 
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The present study seeks to contribute to the literature by analyzing the association between 
intelligence and inflation. By shedding light on the channels through which intelligence is linked to 
inflation, this study aims to fill an existing empirical gap. The closest study to our paper is that of de 
Jong (2002), who shows that culture is an important determinant of inflation in OECD countries. 
There are a several reasons why intelligence may be negatively associated with inflation, the 
first of which social capital, a proclamation that we prefer to refer to as the Putnam hypothesis. 
While early studies fail to find statistically significant link between intelligence and social capital 
(Gurtman & Lion, 1982), the new empirical evidence confirms that cognitive development is a 
substitute for trust (Sturgis et al., 2010). In this vein, cross-country surveys produce strong, howbeit 
indirect, approval to Intelligence–Trust hypothesis (Helliwell & Putnam, 1999). For example, 
Rindermann (2008), using data from 41 countries, documents that national IQ is positively 
associated with trust among population. The conjectured mechanism for the positive effect of 
cognitive abilities on trust that in high-IQ environments, economic agents are better able to correctly 
recognize symptoms of (un)trustworthiness in civil and economic interactions. Sturgis et al. (2010 p. 
52) argues that informed individuals ‘do not suffer the costs of betrayal so frequently, as they are 
less inclined to place their trust in those who are unlikely to honour it’. With its potential to reduce 
transaction costs and addressing the problem of time-inconsistency (Grinblatt et al., 2012), 
intelligence may have direct effect on inflation dissimilar from other determinants.  
Secondly, intelligence may have impact on inflation because it robustly predicts the quality 
of institutional arrangements (Kanyama, 2014; Salahodjaev & Azam, 2015b). For example, Potrafke 
(2012), using data from 125 nations, shows that corruption is lower in high IQ nations. In a similar 
vein, Salahodjaev (2015c) provides evidence on the impact of intelligence on the sizes of shadow 
economy. After taking into account potential feedback from institutions to cognitive development, 
the study documents robust negative effect of intelligence on the size of informal sector relative to 
GDP. Indeed, high-IQ individuals have higher probability to vote (e,g, Hauser, 2000; Rindermann, 
2008; Rindermann et al., 2012), and ‘they elect a government with low inflation policies … and the 
government appoints a conservative central banker who chooses an independent anti-inflation 
monetary policy’ (Hayo, 1998 p. 245). Hence, the preferences of a median voter is the function of 
his cognitive abilities. While abilities are positively associated with wealth and earnings (e.g. Hause, 
1975; Ceci & Williams, 1997), we may conjecture that price stability is one the preferences of 
median voters as a very high share of their income is eroded by inflation. These assumptions are 
similar to Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) who show in democratic societies bureaucrats represent the 
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desires of economic agents. In addition, executing a stable monetary policy requires public support 
and ‘a measure of national intelligence such as IQ provides a good approximation of the degree of 
the support to such policies’ (Kanyama, 2014 p. 52). To that end, the closest study to ours is that of 
Al-Marhubi (2000), who shows inflationary consequences of corruption for nations with high 
corruption. 
On the other hand, there is no precise proxy for the quality of institutions in inflation studies. 
While related studies rely on central bank independence (CBI) index as a measure for the quality of 
anti-inflation policy (Cukierman, 1994; Posen, 1995; Eijffinger et al., 1996; de Haan and Kooi, 
2000; Aisen and Veiga, 2006), the results are at best mixed. In our study, we consider CBI and 
intelligence simultaneously as institutional determinants of inflation. By including intelligence and 
CBI simultaneously in our empirical model, along with other control variables, it is possible to 
reveal any direct impact intelligence would exert on inflation.  
Our study contributes to related studies in a number of ways. First, as in extant literature 
(e.g. Svenson & Nilsson, 1986; Ranyard et al., 2008), we empirically document that inflation is 
linked to human behavior. We investigate the impact of intelligence, a proxy for social capital, on 
inflation, in a quantity theory of money (QTM). Although, definitions and measures of intelligence 
vary substantially, we rely on nation-IQ - a robust measure for the level of cognitive development 
across nations (Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012a).  
Second, we report a novel long run determinant of cross-national differences in inflation, 
namely national IQ. In this article, we test the effect of intelligence on inflation by using 
cross-section of 120 countries in 1990-2013. Indeed, we show that if intelligence increases from the 
level of El Salvador (78 points) to that of Malaysia (91.7 points), the long run inflation decreases by 
27 percent. In particular, the negative effect of intelligence on inflation is stronger in countries with 
low levels of democracy.  
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2. Methodology 
 
This study relies on the quantity theory of money (QTM) as its starting point (e,g, Fisher, 
1911). The QTM can be expressed as: YPMV         
 (1) 
where M is the supply of money, V represents the velocity of money, Y is the supply of 
goods and services, proxied by GDP, and P is the price level. For linearity, we can proceed to 
growth rates: pyvm          (2) 
where lower letters represent growth rates. Hence, the basic econometric model for inflation 
(pi) can be formulated as: ii2i10i uymp       (3) 
In the expanded specification, we add intelligence (IQi), and the vector of control variables 
(X): i3i2i10i u'ymp   XIQi      (4) 
 
3. Data 
 
To investigate the link between intelligence and inflation, we chose the largest available 
sample of countries. The full sample includes 122 countries over the years 1990–2013. We took the 
average of inflation rates to account for business cycle fluctuations.  
In line with related studies, our dependent variable is inflation variable measured by the 
annual growth rate of the GDP deflator as the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change 
in the economy as a whole. It is documented that using genuine inflation rates may lead to 
heteroskedastic residuals due to the presence nations with hyper-inflationary episodes. Hence, as 
suggested by Boyd et al. (2001), we exclude countries with average annual inflation rates greater 
than 100 percent from our estimations. Also, following Perera et al. (2013), we take natural 
logarithm of annual inflation rate. 
Although, intelligence is a heavily debated concept, we use what has become the 
conventional cognitive development indicator on the macroeconomic level, which is nation’s IQ. 
The national IQ data is derived from Lynn & Vanhanen (2012), updated with recent intelligent 
quotient scores from Grigoriev & Lynn (2014). This dataset, a revised study by Lynn & Vanhanen 
(2006), contains national IQs for more than 190 countries, including all the countries with 
population above 40,000.   
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Figure 1 shows the bivariate association between GDP deflator and nation IQ scores. As 
anticipated, intelligence is inversely related to price changes. The negative correlation between 
annual inflation rates and IQ is 0.40.  
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Fig. 1. Inflation and Intelligence 
As conjectured above we include a vector of potential driving forces of inflation. First, we 
control for changes in money supply and real output. The positive evidence on monetary nature of 
inflation dates back to 'the quantity theory of money, posits that inflation is determined solely by the 
change in the relative supply of money and goods' (Kwon et al., 2009 p. 477). The data on money 
and quasi money growth and GDP growth rates is from World Bank.  
Furthermore, we account for the effect monetary and political institutions. There are ample 
cross-national studies conjecturing that inflation and CBI are negatively associated (Berger et al., 
2000). Thus, we need to ensure that estimate for IQ does not capture the monetary policy decisions 
measured by the degree of central bank independence. The CBI index is from Arnone et al. (2007). 
We also include a binary variable for socialist countries in our model.  
We also control for the impact of trade policy. Theoretical studies suggest that inflation is 
lower in more open countries (Romer, 1993), because exchange rates reduce price distortions. 
Another argument to add a measure of trade openness in the regression is that, according to related 
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studies free trade increases the access of households to cheaper goods and services (Triffin & 
Grudel, 1962). The data on bilateral trade relative to GDP is from World Bank.  
Finally, we control for the impact of budget deficit. While there is little evidence for the 
effect of deficit spending on price stability in developed countries (Sill, 2005), empirical studies 
show that budget deficits in developing countries lead to greater inflation (Neyapti, 2003). The 
descriptive statistics of the main variables are reported in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description [Source] Mean (Std. dev.) 
p  Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) [World Bank] 2.008 (0.997) 
m (log) Money and quasi money growth (annual %) [World Bank] 2.683 (0.627) 
y GDP growth (annual %) [World Bank] 3.932 (2.082) 
IQ National IQ [Lynn and Vanhanen, 2012b] 86.589 (10.013) 
CBI Central Bank Independence index [Arnone et al., 2007] 0.596 (0.209) 
Deficit Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) [World Bank] -1.641 (3.420) 
Trade Trade (% of GDP) [World Bank]  88.118 (50.938) 
Democracy Average of "Political Rights" and "Civil Liberties" [Freedom 
House] 
4.471 (1.952) 
Socialist =1 if socialist country [authors’ estimations] 0.131 (0.339) 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results. Model 1 estimates the regression equation 3 (QTM). 
We observe that increase in money supply is positively associated with inflation and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In particular, the estimate for M2 is quantitatively above the coefficient 
reported in Grauwe & Polan (2005) suggesting that there is omitted variable bias. Note that the 
QTM predicts that the estimate for M2 should be approximately one. The coefficient for GDP per 
capita has also anticipated sign and significant at the 1% level. 
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To address the potential omitted variable bias we introduce the control variables. We add 
national IQ in model 2. As expected intelligence is negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. The results suggest when nation IQ increases by 10 points inflation should decrease by 13 
percent. In model 3 CBI is included in the regression. The results for intelligence and the QTM 
remain unchanged while the coefficient for central bank independence is not significant. Thus, 
intelligence seems to have significant impact on price stability even after controlling for the CBI 
index.  
In model 4, we chose to include a dummy variable for socialist countries as they are grouped 
in the upper-right part of the scatter plot (Fig. 1). Indeed the results show that inflation rate will be 
2.05% higher for the socialist countries, which is consistent with the findings of Cukierman et al. 
(2002). The coefficient for IQ is qualitatively unchanged. In models 5 and 6, we progressively add 
budget deficit and trade openness to inflation equation. We document that the budget deficit is not 
significant in our regression, but trade openness does help to reduce inflation. Concerning our main 
hypothesis, intelligence retains its negative effect on inflation, although at a slightly lower level of 
significance. As intelligence increases from the level of El Salvador (78 points) to that of Malaysia 
(91.7 points), the inflation decreases by 27 percent. 
It is important to note, that IQ is a statistically significant determinant of inflation rates in all 
econometric models. Therefore, the findings in Table 2 suggest that intelligence is significantly 
linked to inflation in the cross-national sample.  
 
Table 2 
Intelligence and inflation: main results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
m 1.305*** 1.225*** 1.214*** 1.083*** 1.081*** 1.049*** 
 (0.131) (0.134) (0.133) (0.141) (0.142) (0.145) 
y -0.114*** -0.124*** -0.113*** -0.109*** -0.115*** -0.108*** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
IQ  -0.013* -0.016** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.018** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
CBI   0.352 0.071 0.096 -0.011 
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   (0.312) (0.272) (0.275) (0.304) 
Socialist    0.718*** 0.741*** 0.783*** 
    (0.236) (0.238) (0.245) 
Deficit     0.015 0.020 
     (0.015) (0.014) 
Openness      -0.002* 
      (0.001) 
Constant -1.046*** 0.298 0.378 1.092 1.266* 1.265* 
 (0.314) (0.727) (0.715) (0.752) (0.756) (0.752) 
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 
adj. R2 0.608 0.617 0.617 0.667 0.666 0.672 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Further confirmation of the importance of intelligence to inflation is reported in Table 3, 
where we investigate the possibility that political and civil liberties may reduce inflation. In model 1 
the democratic index, is added in the regression, and we document that the estimated coefficient has 
negative sign and statistically significant at the 5% level. These findings support Satyanath & 
Subramanian (2004, 2007) hypothesis that political participation in developing countries is one of 
the solutions to the control of inflation.  
More importantly, the estimate for intelligence is largely negative and marginally significant 
at the conventional levels of testing. This demonstrates that nation IQ is important in explain 
cross-country differences in inflation. 
In models 2 and 3, we include the interactive terms between IQ and democratic index, and 
between IQ and dummy variable for socialist countries in inflation equation. As shown only 
interaction variable between democracy and intelligence is statistically significant, suggesting that 
the negative effect of intelligence on inflation is stronger in countries with low levels of political and 
civil liberties.   
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Table 3 
Intelligence and inflation: interaction effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
m 1.008*** 0.940*** 1.002*** 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.146) 
y -0.135*** -0.139*** -0.135*** 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) 
IQ -0.014* 0.023 -0.015* 
 (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) 
CBI 0.211 0.457 0.217 
 (0.316) (0.310) (0.317) 
Socialist 0.683*** 0.671*** 0.311 
 (0.246) (0.232) (1.333) 
Deficit 0.021 0.026* 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Openness -0.002* -0.003** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy -0.080** 0.659** -0.081** 
 (0.037) (0.325) (0.038) 
IQ*Democracy  -0.009**  
  (0.004)  
IQ*Socialist   0.004 
   (0.015) 
Constant 1.384* -1.503 1.465* 
 (0.770) (1.524) (0.814) 
N 120 120 120 
adj. R2 0.676 0.691 0.673 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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In regressions that are not reported here, we repeat the estimations in Table 2 by using 
national IQ scores from Wicherts et al. (2010), which provides re-estimated IQ scores for 17 
Sub-Saharan nations. The coefficients are substantially the same. Also, we tested whether our 
findings are sensitive to the inflationary patterns in the high-inflation nations and dropped all the 
nations with average inflation rate for the period 1990 – 2013 above 50%. The results indicate that, 
in line with the results reviewed above, intelligence has had a negative influence on the inflation in 
countries with an average annual inflation rate below 50%. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
 In this article, we explore the relationship between long-run inflation and intelligence in a 
cross-section of 122 countries. In line with ample studies, we use national IQ as a measure for 
intelligence of nations. We argue that intelligence has negative effect of inflation, because national 
IQ is a substitute for social capital from the perspective of Putnam hypothesis. In line with related 
literature, we also mention that intelligence predicts political behavior and support for stable 
macroeconomic environment.  
 The econometric results show negative and statistically significant effect of intelligence on 
inflation. Further, when we interact intelligence and quality of democracy, the results suggest that 
intelligence has a stronger effect in countries with underdeveloped democratic institutions.  
The policy suggestions of our findings is not to call into question the effect of democratization on 
macroeconomic stability in developing nations, because democratic regimes are less volatile 
(Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Instead, we pinpoint, that democracy and intelligence are 
complimentary in inducing efficient anti-inflationary policies. Therefore, the results of this study 
highlight the importance of investing in human and social capital in developing countries with 
underdeveloped institutions.  
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